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On August 30, 1999, in a United Nations-sponsored refer-endum, the people of East Timor affirmatively voted forindependence from Indonesia. The pre- and post-bal-
loting period, however, was marred by violence. Militia forces favor-
ing integration with Indonesia, supported by members of the
Indonesian military, committed grave breaches of international
human rights law. Based on the evidence gathered, which included
reports of widespread intimidation and terror, killings and mas-
sacres, displacement of people, forced expulsion of approxi-
mately one-fourth of the entire population, rape and sexual
harassment of women, disappearances, and destruction of prop-
erty, the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor
(Commission of Inquiry) concluded that the East Timorese were
victims of a premeditated and systematic campaign of crimes
against humanity.
Currently, there are three potential prosecuting authori-
ties: the Indonesian government; the United Nations Transi-
tional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which has
served as East Timor’s transitional government since October
1999; and a United Nations-sponsored international human
rights tribunal operating in Indonesia, East Timor, or any other
relevant jurisdiction. As of November 2000, the Indonesian
government was moving forward with its plans to prosecute
under its criminal code, UNTAET was moving forward with its
attempts to indict and prosecute, and a United Nations-spon-
sored international human rights tribunal has not been estab-
lished. To date, the individuals responsible for these crimes have
not been prosecuted, primarily because Indonesia has neither
the legal capacity nor the political will to do so. Moreover,
Indonesia has thus far refused to extradite suspects to East
Timor at the request of UNTAET. 
Background
East Timor was a Portuguese colony until early 1975 when
Portugal began the process of de-colonization. The people of
East Timor held local elections to declare their independence.
Concerned with this move toward independence, neighboring
Indonesia began laying the groundwork for a coup d’etat,
which occurred in August 1975. Civil war subsequently broke out
between those East Timorese favoring integration with Indone-
sia and those opposed to integration. Ultimately, in December
1975, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor to ensure its
dominance in the region and made the territory Indonesia’s 27th
province. Effectively, Indonesia’s invasion interrupted East
Timor’s decolonization, which remained incomplete until the
1999 referendum. 
In June 1998, after decades of violence and civil unrest,
Indonesia proposed limited self-rule for East Timor and the UN
subsequently incorporated this proposal into a draft constitu-
tional framework. In October 1998, the UN presented the
framework to Indonesia and Portugal. On January 27, 1999, then-
president Habibie of Indonesia announced that if the people
of East Timor voted to reject limited self-rule, the Indonesian
government would rescind the integration law between East
Timor and Indonesia. Thus, the East Timorese had two options:
accept limited self-
rule and remain
integrated with
Indonesia, or reject
limited self-rule in
favor of total inde-
pendence from
Indonesia. 
In May 1999,
Indonesia, the inter-
national de facto
sovereign of East
Timor, and Portu-
gal, the UN-recognized administrator of the East Timorese
non-self-governing territory, signed the “5 May Agreements,”
which proposed “popular consultation” for the East Timorese
people. The parties understood “popular consultation” to mean
a fair campaign and a popular ballot to determine East Timor’s
political status.
In order to facilitate this “popular consultation,” the UN
Security Council formally established the United Nations Mission
in East Timor (UNAMET) to assist the Indonesian government
in securing a peaceful and credible ballot process. Citing intim-
idation and violence, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan post-
poned voter registration. When the vote finally occurred on
August 30, 1999, more than 430,000 registered voters, out of a pop-
ulation of 700,000, cast their ballots.
In the months leading up to the referendum, Indonesia
faced the potential loss of sovereignty over East Timor. Pro-
integration militia, located in East Timor and supported by
members of the Indonesian military, intimidated and terrorized
the East Timorese population. According to the Commission of
Inquiry, pro-integration militia committed systematic and mass
murder, forcibly displaced East Timorese, sexually assaulted
women, and destroyed 60-80 percent of the territory’s public and
private property. On September 3, 1999, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan announced that 78.5 percent of the East Timorese
population voted to reject Indonesia’s special autonomy proposal
in favor of a full transition to independence. The violence
immediately escalated further. Some of the worst violence
occurred in the month following the referendum.
Initially, the international community recognized the impor-
tance of Indonesia establishing its own commission to investi-
gate alleged crimes against humanity committed by its citizens
and military. Yet Indonesia has thus far failed to prosecute any
suspects, provoking international dispute over how best to
achieve accountability and justice. Additionally, UNTAET has
established the Special Panel for Serious Criminal Offenses at
the District Court of Dili (Special Panel). For different reasons
than the Indonesian government, the Special Panel also has
failed to prosecute any alleged suspects. These potential pros-
ecuting authorities, as well as the proposed international tri-
bunal, face legal and political obstacles.
Indonesian Obstacles to Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity
Lack of Political Will 
In early 2000, Indonesia’s Commission of Inquiry into Human
Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) reported the names
of 33 people—including militia leaders, police officers, and
senior military officers—whom it believed to be directly or indi-
rectly responsible for the pre- and post-referendum violence in
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East Timor. Since that time, however, the Indonesian government
has demonstrated a lack of political will to prosecute the alleged
perpetrators. Following months of investigation during which the
33 suspects were questioned, Indonesian investigators indicated
their intention to indict 19 individuals. By September 2000, the
Indonesian government had released a provisional list of the 19
individuals to be indicted. This provisional list did not, however,
include the names of those believed to be most responsible,
such as General Wiranto, a senior Indonesian military official
believed to have ordered the alleged crimes against humanity. 
Shortly thereafter, Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki
Darusman announced that he would prosecute 22 suspects,
including senior military officials and militia members. Darusman
noted, however, that trials would begin only after the Indonesian
parliament enacted legislation establishing a special domestic
human rights tribunal to hear the cases. Darusman expressed his
expectation that such legislation would be enacted in December
2000, yet that appears to be a remote possibility. Further, even if
such legislation were enacted, there is no indication that such a
tribunal will apply anything but
Indonesian law, which is inadequate
to address these crimes. In addition
to its unwillingness to prosecute
domestically, the Indonesian gov-
ernment has made clear it would not
cooperate with an international
human rights tribunal should a tri-
bunal be established. A primary rea-
son for Indonesia’s opposition is that
an international tribunal would inevitably apply international
humanitarian and human rights law instead of applying the
Indonesian Criminal Code, which Indonesia would prefer.
Legal Obstacles 
In addition to the Indonesian government’s lack of political
will to initiate prosecutions, a number of legal obstacles pre-
clude the effective prosecution of the perpetrators. Two obstacles
in particular pose the greatest threat to effective prosecutions. First,
the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) passed a
constitutional amendment in August 2000 (Article 28(I) of the
Indonesian Constitution) enshrining the principle of non-
retroactivity in Indonesian law. Second, the Indonesian Criminal
Code does not contain provisions for collective responsibility.
The principle of non-retroactivity prohibits a government
from prosecuting its citizens for acts that were not crimes under
domestic law when they were committed. Article 28(I) of the
Indonesian Constitution reads, “the right not to be charged on
the basis of retroactivity is a basic human right that may not be
breached under any circumstances” (emphasis added). Thus,
even if the Indonesian Parliament were to enact legislation
recognizing crimes against humanity, such legislation could
only apply prospectively. In other words, Indonesia would still
be precluded from prosecuting those individuals who com-
mitted grave human rights abuses leading up to and immedi-
ately following the referendum in East Timor. 
It is important to evaluate Indonesia’s constitutional amend-
ment on non-retroactivity in the context of customary inter-
national law. According to Article 15(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), “[n]o one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was com-
mitted.” Article 15(2), however, provides that ‘[n]othing in
[Article 15] shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of nations.” Article 15 of the
ICCPR is considered customary international law. Further, Arti-
cle 53 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties
stipulates that norms of customary international law are non-
derogable and “can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.” Under cus-
tomary international law, crimes against humanity are “crimi-
nal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations” and thus constitute an exception to the
principle of non-retroactivity. By amending its constitution to
include an unconditional principle of non-retroactivity, Indone-
sia therefore violated customary international law.
In addition to the constitutional amendment, the Indonesian
Criminal Code also precludes such retroactive prosecutions. Arti-
cle 1 of the Indonesian Criminal Code provides that an offense
can only be prosecuted under a law that existed at the time the
offense was committed. Yet when the pre- and post-referen-
dum violence occurred in East Timor, there were not, and still
are not, any provisions in the Code for crimes against human-
ity. Thus, it is likely that Indonesian-led prosecutions would be
limited to prosecuting alleged sus-
pects for “ordinary crimes” as
defined in Indonesia’s Criminal
Code. For instance, it is likely that sys-
tematic mass murder would be tried
under Article 340 of the Indonesian
Criminal Code, which deals with
premeditated murder and is pun-
ishable by the death sentence or life
imprisonment, and torture would
be tried under Article 355, which deals with premeditated
attempts to cause serious injuries and is punishable by a maxi-
mum sentence of 12 years in prison. A more disturbing scenario
is that there are certain crimes, such as forced displacement of
persons, which cannot be prosecuted at all under the Indone-
sian Criminal Code.
Additionally, the Indonesian Criminal Code does not con-
tain any provisions for collective responsibility which is an inter-
nationally-recognized legal principle underlying crimes against
humanity. The Indonesian government has yet to revise its
domestic law to include provisions that would facilitate the
prosecution of senior police and military officials for the crimes
against humanity committed by those under their command.
Although Indonesia has indicted some senior military officials
and militia leaders, it is unclear when and how they will be pros-
ecuted. Failure to prosecute those in command contravenes the
principle of collective responsibility, which the international com-
munity has recognized since the Nuremberg trials as a general
principle of modern international law. More recently, the
statutes of the ICTY and ICTR recognize the principle of col-
lective responsibility. Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute enumer-
ates the following principle: because the act “was committed by
a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal respon-
sibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” Article 6(3) of
the ICTR Statute, which applies to non-international conflicts,
mirrors Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.
The principle of collective responsibility includes a number
of elements: a duty to exercise authority over subordinates;
equality of responsibility with the subordinate; actual knowledge
that the subordinate planned or carried out the unlawful con-
duct, or in the absence of actual knowledge, sufficient infor-
mation to enable the superior to conclude that the subordinate
There are certain crimes, such as forced
displacement of persons, which cannot be
prosecuted at all under the Indonesian
Criminal Code.
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planned or executed such conduct; and failure on the part of
the superior to take the necessary steps to prevent the crime. Ulti-
mately, the superior is responsible if he or she orders a subor-
dinate to commit, or attempt to commit, a crime against human-
ity or war crime. 
East Timorese Prosecutions
East Timor has attempted to conduct prosecutorial investi-
gations of its citizens and militias. These investigations, however,
have been hampered by a lack of cooperation on the part of the
Indonesian government. Indonesian resistance to East Timorese
prosecutions contravenes the April 6, 2000, Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Cooperation in Legal, Judicial and Human
Rights Related Matters, signed by Indonesian Attorney General
Darusman and Chief of UNTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello. For
example, Indonesia has refused to comply with UNTAET’s
extradition requests to return East Timorese suspects that fled
to Indonesia after the violence. To justify its refusal to extradite,
the Indonesian government, as well as pro-integration groups,
have asserted the following arguments: to do so would under-
mine Indonesian sovereignty; East Timor is not yet a sovereign
nation; and there is no extradition agreement between Indone-
sia and East Timor. 
Faced with an impatient international community, and the
increasing likelihood of an international human rights tribunal,
Indonesia agreed, in early November 2000, to allow East
Timorese prosecutors to question 39 witnesses. This agreement
followed the Indonesian government’s offer to allow East
Timorese investigators to question Eurico Guterres, leader of
the East Timorese Aitarak militia group. It remains unclear, how-
ever, when Indonesia will, in fact, permit East Timorese inves-
tigators to travel to Indonesia to carry out these questionings.
International Human Rights Tribunal 
UN Secretary-General Annan has met with Indonesian Pres-
ident Wahid and Vice-President Sukarnoputri to explain, among
other things, the UN Security Council’s intention to establish
an international human rights tribunal if Indonesia fails to
prosecute the perpetrators of the East Timorese violence. As
early as February 2, 2000, the Commission of Inquiry issued a
report recommending that the UN “should establish an inter-
national human rights tribunal consisting of judges appointed
by the United Nations, preferably with the participation of
members of East Timor and Indonesia.” The Commission of
Inquiry explained that the tribunal “would sit in Indonesia,
East Timor and any other relevant territory to receive com-
plaints and to try and sentence those accused.” Conceivably, the
tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction would cover events beginning
in January 1999. Furthermore, the tribunal would be empow-
ered to prosecute and sentence individuals “regardless of the
nationality of the individual or where that person was when the
violations were committed.” As of November 2000, however, the
Security Council has not exercised its Chapter VII powers to
establish such a tribunal.
One obstacle to the establishment of an international human
rights tribunal is the anticipated opposition of China and per-
haps other Security Council members. International pressure
could be applied to prevent China from vetoing an international
human rights tribunal. Should a tribunal overcome such polit-
ical obstacles and be established, it would have two distinct
advantages for East Timorese seeking justice. First, an interna-
tional human rights tribunal has the ability to prosecute under
international law those directly and indirectly responsible for
the commission of crimes against humanity. Second, an inter-
national human rights tribunal can provide capable and impar-
tial judges. Consequently, an international human rights tribunal
offers East Timor the most promising hope for accountability.
Conclusion
All evidence thus far indicates that Indonesia has neither the
legal capacity nor the political will to prosecute crimes against
humanity and bring senior-level police and military officials to
justice. After meeting with Secretary-General Annan in early
November 2000, Indonesian Attorney General Darusman
promised that trials would begin no later than February 2001.
It remains to be seen whether prosecutions will begin. Fur-
ther, for months the Indonesian government thwarted East
Timor’s investigations and prosecutions by refusing to cooperate,
specifically by withholding evidence and access to witnesses
located in Indonesia. Finally, should Indonesia refuse to coop-
erate with an international human rights tribunal, such a tribunal
likely would experience the same frustrations and inefficacy as
the East Timorese investigations and attempts to prosecute.
The three prosecutorial options for justice in East Timor all face
obstacles, and each leaves unanswered the question—will there
be justice? 
* Barbara Cochrane Alexander is a J.D. Candidate at the Wash-
ington College of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
East Timor, continued from previous page
One obstacle to the establishment of an
international human rights tribunal 
is the anticipated opposition 
of China and perhaps other 
Security Council members.
Summer 2001
academy on Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law
May 29 – June 15, 2001
Washington College of Law
Washington, D.C.
General and Specialized Courses in English and Spanish
• Law School Credit or a Certificate of Attendance
• Distinguished Lecture Series
• Visits to international organizations and NGOs
• Workshops, specialized conferences, and career panels
For information, visit our website at: 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humright/hracademy
Tel: (202) 274-4070, Fax (202) 274-4198
E-mail: hracademy@wcl.american.edu
3
Alexander: East Timor: Will There Be Justice?
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2000
